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THE RELATION BETWEEN THE JUDICIARY AND THE
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES
OF THE GOVERNMENT IN NORWAY*

CHIEF JUSTICE

ROLv

RYSSDAL

SUPREME COURT OF NORWAY

On March 31, 1981. the first Oscar and Amelia Fode Memorial Law
Lecture was presented at the Chester Fritz Auditorium in Grand Forks, North
Dakota. The person who delivered that first lecture inas the Honorable Rolv
Einar Ryssdal, Chief./ustice of the Supreme Court of Norway. ChiefJustice
Ryssdal graciously accepted the arduous job of inaugurating this lecture series.
He and his wife, Signe Marie Stray Ryssdal, came to the United States and
devoted a busy week to lectures, class appearances, Bar Association meetings,
meetings with pihlic officials. and meetings iwith citizens of North Dakota.
Chief.Justice Ryssdal began his legal career in a barrister'soffice in Oslo,
Norway, and at the same time, served as Deputy, udge in the county legal circuit
qf Eiker, Modum, and Stidal. He was later named Deputy Crown Prosecutorin
the Attorney General's office. At the same time he began teaching jurisprudence at
the University of Oslo. He continues to serve from time to time on that law
faculty as an cxamiination
.judge. He engaged in private practie as a Supreme
Court Barrister until 19.56 when he was appointed Under Si'cretary of]ustie
with the portfolio qf Permanent Secretary, Ministry oJustice. In 1964 Chief
Justice Ryssdal was named to the Norwegian Supreme Court. He assumed his
role as Chief.Justice in 1969. In addition to serving with the h ighest Court in
Norway, Chief Justice Ryssdal is also the Vice President of the European Court
of Human Rights.
No more distinguished person could have been selected to inaugurate the
Fode Lecture Series. It was an honor for the University oA'North Dakota School
o0 Law to be able to host the Chief/.iu.tiCe and Mrs. Rvsdal. It is with great
pride that we present this trainscripto/ his Icture.
Karl P. l'Iarden
I)ean, School ofI.aw
University of North Dakota

*Firs annual Oscar and Ainelia F'hl I .iw I, Ctur iprcscnwtd' Marh 51, 19)81, in (;rand
North Dakota.
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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

It was an honor and a pleasure for me to be invited to the
University of North Dakota to become the first Oscar and Amelia
Fode Law Lecturer. In my lecture I will speak of the position of the
judiciary in Norway and its relationship to the legislative and
executive branches of the government. First, I will examine some
questions concerning the right of Norwegian courts to try the
constitutionality of statutory laws enacted by Parliament (Storting).
Second, I will discuss the possibility for the courts to exercise
control with actions of the executive department. Third I would like
to say a little about the relation between the legislator's competence
to pass laws and the judge as lawmaker.
I should perhaps begin by saying some words about the
Norwegian constitution that was signed on May 17, 1814, at
Eidsvoll, forty-five miles north of Oslo. The American Declaration
of Independence of 1776, the American Federal Constitution of
1787, the French Declaration on the Rights of Man and Citizens of
1789, and the American Bill of Rights amendments adopted in
1791 were all well known to the authors of the Norwegian
Constitution of 1814. Sovereignty of the people, separation of
powers, and protection of human rights may be regarded as the
three key concepts in framing both the American Constitution and
the Norwegian Constitution. But the manner of presentation of
these ideas were different in many respects.
As to human rights, the constitutional committee of the
Constituent Assembly at Eidsvoll came to the conclusion that only
principles - the necessity of which had been established by the
experience of the Norwegian nation - were to be included. Instead
of a collective declaration of rights, the Norwegian Constitution of
1814 contained only a small number of rules of the kind found in
the declaration of rights in constitutions of other countries, for
example, the ban on retroactive laws, t the guarantee of freedom of
4
3
the press, 2 protection against arbitrary imprisonment and search,
and the right to receive full compensation for expropriation. 5 Later
a few amendments were made. Thus, a declaration of the principle
of religious freedom was introduced by an amendment of 19646 and
was adopted on the 150th anniversary of the Constitution.
As to the principles of sovereignty of the people and the
separation of powers, two principles which may be somewhat
1. CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGOoM OF NORWAY art. 97.
2. Id. art. 100.
3. Id. art. 99, para. 1.
4. Id. art. 102.
5. Id. art. 105.
6. Id. art. 2, para. 1.
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difficult to reconcile, there are both similarities and differences in
the American and the Norwegian Constitutions. In both countries
it was recognized that the powers should be divided between
branches of government. The legislative power in the United States
was entrusted to the Congress, and in Norway to the Storting. The
American President and the Norwegian King had the executive
power. An independent judiciary was established in both countries
as the third branch of the government. There was, however, one
major difference. In the United States the executive power was
placed in the hands of a president elected by the people, whereas in
Norway it was committed to a hereditary monarch. But personal
royal power was unable to withstand the progress of democracy.
Without any changes in the written Constitution of Noway, the
system of separation of powers embodied within it has been
replaced by a parliamentary system. Under this system, which was
introduced in the 1880s, the Parliament (Storting) decides the
composition of the Cabinet, while the Cabinet decides the actions
of the Crown.
Contrary to the United Kingdom and some other countries
with a parliamentary government, Norway has a written
constitution which contains a number of rules for the protection of
human rights, and which also is the constitutional basis for an
independent judiciary as the third branch of the government. The
American Constitution declares, "The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." 7 The Norwegian Constitution states, "The Supreme
Court pronounces judgment in the final instance." 8 It is not
expressly stated in the two constitutions that the courts have the
power to set aside a law as unconstitutional and that the courts have
the power to exercise judicial control with the actions of the
executive department, but the doctrine that the courts have such a
power was developed in practice.
I will now report briefly on the Norwegian constitutional
practice in this field, but such a report must necessarily be
summary and selective. In deciding cases brought before them, the
courts have to interpret and apply the law. If two laws conflict with
each other, the Court must decide which law is to be given
precedence. Should a conflict arise between a statutory law and the
Constitution, it would seem to be reasonable that the Constitution
should be given precedence, by virtue of being a higher source of
7. U.S.

CONST. art. III, § 1.
8. CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF NORWAY art. 88, para. 1.
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law. But it is not obvious that the courts have the power to try the
constitutionality of laws, and thus to set aside a law which, in the
opinion of the Court, violates the Constitution. In the United
States such a power for the courts was, however, established nearly
180 years ago in the well-known 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.9
Chief Justice.John Marshall's argument in this early decision of the
American Supreme Court may nowadays seem to be very logical
and almost inevitable, but the establishment of such a power for the
Court was in fact a constitutional revolution.
Norway is one of the few other countries where the same
fundamental principle was established in the last century. It is not
likely that the Norwegian founding fathers at Eidsvoll in 1814 had
knowledge of the American decision of 1803. I do not think that
they made up their mind as to whether Norwegian courts ought to
have such a competence. The principle was not clearly accepted in
Norway until the end of the century. In a .judgment of 1890 the
Norwegian Supreme Court set aside a commercial law because it
had retroactive effect, and thus, in the opinion of the Court,
violated the Constitution.10 Unlike Chief.Justice Marshall in the
great case of Marbury v. Madison,"1 the Norwegian justices in the

1890 case did not give specific arguments for the Court's right to
try the constitutionality of the law. But, all the same, the judgment
was a clear precedent.
Later on, a number of judgments were pronounced in which
the Supreme Court reversed laws which the Court found to be in
violation of the Constitution. In the decision of an important case
from 1918 the Supreme Court discussed the question of the Court's
competence to try the constitutionality of laws enacted by
Parliament (Storting), and all the.justices were of the opinion that
12
the Court had such competence.
In a Supreme Court plenary decision of 1976, Justice Knut
Blom, who delivered the majority opinion, said the following:
Firstly, I consider it necessary to say a few words on the
competence of the Courts of Law to try the
constitutionality of laws.
It is clear that if the application of an Act leads to results
which are a breach of the Constitution, the Courts must
base their decision on the rule which follows from the
9.5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
10. Norsk Retstidende 455 (1890).
11.5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
12. Norsk Retstidende 401 (1918).
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Constitution and not on the provision contained in the
Act itself. This has been expressly stated in a long series
of Supreme Court judgments and it is confirmed in
Section 2 of the Act of 25 June 1926, which prescribes
special rules on the Supreme Court's handling of cases of
conflict with constitutional law. What we are concerned
with here is an established rule of constitutional
customary law, and the competence of the Courts - the
so-called right of review - has not been disputed by the
municipality or the Ministry of.Justice in this case. It is
also beyond doubt that this right of review also involves a
duty to review or try the constitutionality of laws, so that
it is incumbent on the Courts, whenever the issue arises,
to decide whether the Constitution has in fact been
breached.13
The judgment was not unanimous, but all members of the Court
agreed with this-statement.
When a constitutional question is raised in a case, this
ques tion has to be tried by the ordinary courts. In Norway we have
no special constitutional court. Not only the Supreme Court, but
also the inferior courts have the competence to try the
constitutionality of laws. If, however, a constitutional question is
raised, it is likely that final decision in the case will be taken by the
Supreme Court. We do not often have such cases.
The Supreme Court is ordinarily set with five .judges, both in
civil and criminal cases. But if a case is of extraordinary
importance, it may be tried by the Supreme Court in plenary
session (eighteen justices). This is prescribed in a law of 1926, 14 and
according to this law, the Supreme Court in plenary session may
set aside a law as unconstitutional.
The right of the courts to try the constitutionality of laws has
certainly not played the same role in Norway as it has in the United
States. A comparison between the two countries illustrates how the
same legal principle may function differently under different
circumstances.
Some of the most important constitutional provisions in the
United States are worded in general terms, whereas the provisions
contained in the Norwegian Constitution are more exact in their
wording. We have no such vague and general clauses as the "due
13. Norsk Retstidende (as translated) 1,5 (1976).
14. Act of.June 25, 1926, No. 2, § 2, 4.
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process" clause and the "equal protection" clause of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.
Perhaps more important is the difference in the attitude of the
judges. Norwegian judges have been more reluctant to follow their
own personal views on what is just and reasonable. I think it can be
said that the decisions of the Norwegian Supreme Court in
constitutional cases are made only on legal grounds. Whatever one
may say in that respect, I think it is certain that some of the most
important decisions do not reflect the Court's view of the wisdom
or desirability of the legislation in question.
In this connection I would like to quote some words from an
early constitutional decision of the American Supreme Court. I
5
refer to a decision of 1819 in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland.,
The question involved in that case was whether Congress had the
power to charter a national bank or whether the power to charter a
bank was reserved to the states.' 6 Chief Justice Marshall, writing
for the unanimous Court, made reference to some special factors to
be taken into account when interpreting a constitution and
continued as follows:
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt
measures which are prohibited by the constitution; or
should Congress, under the pretext of executing its
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not
entrusted to the government; it would become the painful
duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a
decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the
law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited, and
is really calculated to effect any of the objects entrusted to
the government, to undertake here to inquire into the
degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which
circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on
legislative ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to
such a power. I7
When both a law and a special provision of the Constitution
apply to a particular case, it may be that the legislative assembly
(Storting) in passing the law has carefully considered the
constitutionality of the law and come to the conclusion that there is
no conflict between the law and the Constitution. Some citizens
15. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
16. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
17. Id. at 423.
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may, however, be of a different opinion, and the courts accordingly
will have to decide whether the law violates the Constitution. The
question could then arise whether the courts ought to attach special
importance to the opinion expressed by the legislator.
In a Supreme Court plenary judgment of 1976, Justice Knut
Blom, who delivered the majority opinion, said:
However, there are differences of opinion as to how much
is required before the Courts may set aside an Act of
legislation as being a breach of the Constitution. I do not
feel called upon to discuss this issue in general terms. The
solution will to some extent depend on which
constitutional provisions we are dealing with. If we are
concerned with provisions protecting the personal
freedom of the individual or his security, I assume that
the supremacy of the Constitution must prevail. If, on the
other hand, we are concerned with constitutional
provisions regulating the way the other Powers of State
have organized their administrative procedures oi
internal spheres of competence, I agree with the majority
spokesman in the case tried in plenary session in 1952 ...
that the Courts must to a large extent respect the
particular views of the Storting (Parliament) itself.
Constitutional provisions protecting economic rights
must by and large occupy a middle position between these
two examples.
It is quite clear to me that the Storting's understanding of
the relationship of the Act to such constitutional
provisions must be of particular importance when the
Courts are to decide on the Act's constitutionality and the
Courts must show great reticence in allowing their
assessment to override that of the legislator. .

.

. On this

basis I, for my part, would hesitate to assert that a breach
of the Constitution had taken place in a case where there
was cause for reasonable doubt and where the Storting
had clearly given the matter due consideration and based
itself on the view that the Act was not in conflict with the
Constitution.
But if the right to review the
constitutionality of statutory law is to have any reality,
the Courts must use this right in cases where they find
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that the Act leads to results which beyond any reasonable
doubt conflict with the Constitution. 18
The minority by and large agreed with this statement, but in
deciding the case the minority, to which I myself belonged, would
have granted the legislator more discretion as to what is to be
considered as "full compensation" when private property is
expropriated for public use. 19 From my own grounds in the
judgment I quote:
As regards the constitutional issue raised in this case, I
should finally like to say:
When
deciding
the expropriatee's
claim
for
compensation, the Courts - as pointed out during the
voting in the present case - have the duty to base
themselves on the provision in Article 105 of the
Constitution. But also in this field the Storting is entitled
to enact statutory laws. The powers of the legislator are
not unlimited. But Article 105 of the Constitution does
not contain definitive limits for the Storting's right to
regulate by statutory law questions which arise when the
interests of the State require that the property-owner
surrender his property. Nor are such definitive limits on
the power of the legislator determined by constitutional
practice. In this field of law then it must first and foremost
20
be the task of the legislator to interpret the Constitution.
Opinions have been divided as to whether a distinction could
and should be made between constitutional provisions protecting
personal freedom and provisions protecting economic rights. I
think that the unanimous dictum in the plenary judgment of 1976
quoted above is well-founded. As to economic and commercial
rights, the courts, in my opinion, should be careful not to adopt
attitudes that could be liable to upset the delicate balance between
the legislator and the judiciary. When, however, fundamental
human rights are involved, the courts should exercise their power
strictly for the protection of the individual person.
I would like to mention that some important human' rights,
which are not contained in the Norwegian Constitution, are now
18. Norsk Rctstidende (as translated) 1,5 (1976).

19. Id. at22.
20. Id at36.
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included in international binding conventions on human rights. 2 1 I
am not aware of conflicts between existing national legislation and
the provisions of the international conventions. If, however, such a
conflict should arise, it would be for the courts to decide the
conflict, and I think it could be argued that precedence should be
given to the convention.
From the end of the Second World War and up to 1975, the
Norwegian Supreme Court overruled a law only on two
occasions. 22 But the above-mentioned Supreme Court plenary
judgments of 197623 and also two plenary judgments of 1977 and
197924 clearly indicate that the Court's power to try the
constitutionality of laws is still a reality which the legislative
assembly has to take into consideration.
Moreover, the fact that only a few laws have been set aside
does not mean that the power to try the constitutionality is of little
importance. The content and value of some constitutional
provisions are also of importance as means of interpretation of
statutory laws. If there can be reasonable doubt regarding how a
law is to be understood, the courts will always try to interpret the
law in such a way that the law, as applied, is in conformity with the
Constitution.
During the years between the two World Wars some attempts
were made to abolish the right of the Norwegian courts to try the
constitutionality of statutory laws. These attempts were
unsuccessful, and it is not likely that any political party will now
attack this right. Most people undoubtedly prefer that the courts
have such a right, and the legislators accept it as a part of the
ground rules under which they have to work.
More important than reviewing the constitutionality of
statutory laws may be that the courts of justice have to exercise
judicial control over the actions of the executive department. With
the growing interference and regulations from executive
authorities, it is essential that the courts are empowered to decide
any question raised by citizens as to whether such authorities have
exceeded their competence or handled a matter in a way that
cannot be .justified.
If I were to undertake a thorough examination of the judicial
control that Norwegian courts exercise in this field, I would
certainly have to give more than one lecture. Here and now my
21. SeeInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of December 16, 1966: European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights of 1950.
22. Norsk Retstidende 1418(1964): Norsk Retstidlndc 932 (1952).
23. Norsk Retstidende 1 (1976).
24. Norsk Retstidencle 572 (1979): Norsk Retstidende 24 (1977).
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comments on this subject necessarily must be very brief and
fragmentary. In Norway we have no special administrative courts.
When citizens bring actions against executive authorities, the cases
are tried by the ordinary courts. Every year we have many cases
between citizens on the one side and the State or a municipality on
the other side.
There was nothing explicit in the Norwegian Constitution
about the power of the courts to exercise judicial control over the
activities of the executive branch of government. The legal basis is
found in constitutional practice. In 1818 the Supreme Court
invalidated an administrative decision, 25 and some other judgments
followed in the next few years. In this way the doctrine that the
courts have such a power was firmly founded a long time before. At
the end of the last century it was established that the courts also
have the right to try the constitutionality of statutory laws. 26 Later a
great number of judgments were rendered, and it is now a well
established constitutional rule that the courts have the competence
to review administrative decisions.
I cannot go into details as to the content of this competence.
Very briefly it may be said that the court may invalidate an
administrative decision if the authorities concerned are not
authorized by the statute on which they relied, have not interpreted
the law correctly, have been mistaken about the plain facts on
which the decision was taken, or have not handled the case in
conformity with the prescribed procedure. Even if there is no such
fault, the decision could be invalidated by reason of abuse of power,
or it could be invalidated if the decision is found to be arbitrary or
extremely unreasonable. On the other hand it is not sufficient that
the court disagrees with the decision taken by a competent
administrative authority. It should also be mentioned that an
imperfection or shortcoming in the prescribed procedure may be
left out of account if this defect, in the opinion of the court, has
been of no importance to the outcome.
The right of the courts of judicial review comprises all
administrative decisions, including the decisions taken by the
highest administrative bodies. Under Norwegian law there is no
general exception in this respect. In connection with a specific
hydropower construction project, a debate has arisen on the power
of the courts to try an administrative decision of the Storting. Some
statutory acts expressly prescribe that an administrative decision is
25. Norway Sutpreme Court .judgment of October 28, 1818. See
renerallv DEN D0MMFNDF NtAKTI)OMSTOI.ENE 0(; R TS'TVI
1
tKI.IN(.N 1814-1964, at 164-65 (1967).
26. Norsk Rctst idtnd

455 (1890).

LAW LECTURE

to be adopted by the Storting. According to an act on the regulation
of watercourses, the Storting must give its consent to projects of
major importance.
In the dispute just mentioned it is asserted that several
mistakes have been made, for example, that the interests of an
ethnic minority and some environment problems are not
sufficiently taken into account. On the other hand it is maintained
that the view of the Storting must prevail. As the case is now before
the Supreme Court, I will not comment upon the issues involved.
Because of the extraordinary importance of the case I have decided
that it shall be tried by the Supreme Court in plenary session.
In addition to the fact that administrative decisions may be
brought before the courts, there are rules relating to appeals in
administrative cases.2 7 Furthermore, we have in Norway a system
with a special Ombudsman for the Government Administration to
whom an appeal may be lodged by anyone who feels he has suffered
a wrong on the part of the public administration. The Ombudsman
is chosen by the Storting for a four-year term of office. The choice is
not political, and the Ombudsman conducts his activity entirely
independently of the Storting. The Ombudsman is not entitled to
make binding decisions, but only to express his opinion. However,
the Ombudsmen we have had in Norway since the system entered
into force in 1963 have enjoyed great prestige, and the Government
Administration has practically always paid heed to their opinions.
In recent years new statutory laws about the procedure in
administrative cases as well as the practice of the courts 28 have, to
some extent, increased the authority of the judiciary over the
activities of the executive branch. Even so, I should think that the
state of affairs in this field is very different in Norway than in the
United States. The Norwegian courts have not intervened in the
administration in the same way as American courts have done,
such as in the operation of school systems. I have been told that
there is scarcely any sort of government action which is not subject
to .judicial review in the United States, and that you have moved in
the direction of so-called "government by the judiciary."
In Norway it is not so. If an administrative decision is
invalidated, the court must, of course, state in the judgment what
has been done wrong, but on the whole, the courts cannot order the
executive to do something a certain way, and thus become involved
in the administrative problems of choice and implementation.
27. Administrative Procedure Act ofFeb. 10. 1967, ch. VI.
28. See Act ofAug. 13, 1915, ch. 33 (rules ofcourt procedure in civil cases). Seealso.]. ANDENAES,
STATSFORFATNINCEN I NORGE 305-51 (1981).
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A judge is, of necessity, not only an interpreter but also a
lawmaker. The role of the judge in this respect is certainly different
from that of the legislator. The courts have to apply the law to
particular cases, and the .judiciary is instituted for keeping the law.
On the other hand it is a main task for the legislature to enact new
laws, and if citizens want the law to be changed, they can for that
purpose submit petitions and elect representatives to the
lawmaking body.
It should also be mentioned that the legislator - when it is
necessary to introduce new rules of law - is able to take care of
problems of transition from the old law to the new law. If a court
gives a new interpretation to a certain rule of law, a problem as to
the temporal effect of such a.judicial ruling may arise, the problem
of retroactivity or prospectivity. For these and some other reasons I
would, at the outset, think that the courts ought to have judicial
self-restraint. They should not be too active in lawmaking.
This being said I would, however, like to emphasize that it
sometimes may be necessary for the courts to take the lead. The
courts, particularly the final courts, should not refrain from making
new law when, after careful consideration, they come to the
conclusion that a change is needed.
If we refer to the law as something the courts should be faithful
to, we are not only referring to rules of law which legislators have
brought into the statute book, but also to those principles which
form the backbone of the law. In a society where social conditions
are constantly developing and changing, old principles of law will
have to be applied to new and unforeseen situations. In this
adjustment, legislative and judicial activities could come quite
close. Principles of law may be adapted to the changed conditions
by statutes, but also by judicial decisions, and to settle the
adjustment in the best way, an interaction between the legislative
and the judicial department may be necessary.
The relationship between the judiciary, the legislative, and the
executive branches of government is of fundamental importance,
having great influence both on the administration of.justice and on
government actions. The judiciary in the United States has
assumed a far-reaching authority over the activities of the other two
branches, and the Supreme Court of the United States has become
the most powerful.judicial body that the world has ever seen.
The position of the Norwegian courts is somewhat different.
But the judiciary is, all the same, in a particular position, not
because the courts have to take the most important decisions -
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that is for the Parliament (Storting) and the Cabinet (Regiering) but because the judiciary is in every way independent, and also
because the Norwegian courts have to excercise judicial control
over the activities of the other two branches of government.

